Den oförliknelige Slavoj Žižek skriver följande i Interrogating the Real:

“Someone asked Herr Keuner if there is a God. Herr Keuner said: I advise you to think about how your behaviour would change with regard to the answer to this question. If it would not change, then we can drop the question. If it would change, then I can help you at least insofar as I can tell you: You already decided: You need a God.” (Brecht)

Brecht is right here: we are never in a position directly to choose between theism and atheism, since the choice as such is already located within the field of belief. ‘Atheism’ (in the sense of deciding not to believe in God) is a miserable, pathetic stance of those who long for God but cannot find him (or who ”rebel against God”). A true atheist does not choose atheism: for him, the question itself is irrelevant – THIS is the stance of a truly atheistic SUBJECT.

Jag finner, som ateist, Žižeks bombastiska språkbruk i de två sista meningarna lätt störande, men om bortser från det tycker jag att han har en poäng i att en ateist inte väljer att vara i avsaknad av tro på en en viss gud. Slutsatsen i hans resonemang bör dock inte riktas bara mot ateister utan även mot religiösa: Det är i ingetdera fallet så att uppfattningar om gudars existens utgör ett medvetet val. Uppfattningarna infinner sig, givet människans förmåga och sätt att resonera och givet den information som finns tillgänglig.

Innebär detta att ateister inte bör kritisera religiösa människor för deras (icke-valda) tro? Nej. Jag utvecklar min allmänna syn i den här frågan i ”A Note on the Concept of Belief”, i vilken jag bl.a. skriver:

But if beliefs are not the results of choices, and if Christians or the Christian god cannot condemn the unbelief of atheists without being evil (since only conscious acts of the will can properly be morally condemned), can atheists urge Christians – who did not choose to believe – to reject their belief that God exists? Yes, for the following reason. Even though we hold non-chosen beliefs, it has been shown above that there is room for rational reappraisal of beliefs using reason. That is, if we, perhaps at the instruction of someone else, detect that we have been using irrational criteria for judging fact claims, or that we have not considered all available evidence with bearing on the fact claim in question, it is possible to have one’s beliefs revised. So by choosing to throw out irrationalities, we may very well arrive at new convictions and beliefs. But we have to be willing to make such choices and to open up our minds. Interestingly, this can be done. And so the atheist critique of theists can and should continue.

Detta skrev jag för 21 år sedan, men det äger alltjämt, som jag ser det, sin riktighet. Dvs. jag håller inte med Žižek om att frågan om guds existens är eller bör vara irrelevant för en ateist – den är relevant i den mån man anser människors (icke-valda) religiösa tro felaktig (och korrigerbar) eller socialt skadlig.