Rationella, trots allt?

Det är populärt, numera, att framställa människor som irrationella. Experimentell forskning sägs visa att människor inte beter sig i enlighet med teorin om förväntad nytta, och som alternativ har bl.a. prospect theory utvecklats. Den sägs på ett bättre sätt kunna förklara människors val under osäkerhet. Nu går Krzysztof Kontek till teoretisk motattack, i ”The Illusion of Irrationality”:

Expected Utility Theory, based as it is on the assumption that wealth changes are perceived in absolute terms, can neither predict nor explain the preference reversals observed in the Common Ratio and Allais paradoxes. This leads to the conclusion that people are irrational. However, once it is assumed that wealth changes are perceived in relative terms, the preference reversals are fully predictable and there is no reason to regard people as irrational. As the perception of wealth changes in relative terms was stated even by Kahneman and Tversky, people’s behavior should be regarded as rational and the relative utility function should be used for its description. It follows that the stated irrationality is merely a result of using an improper model. This is what we call the illusion of irrationality.

Vad säger beteendeekonomerna om detta? (Man kan kanske fråga sig om detta är en substantiell eller semantisk diskussion.)