Ibland genomförs kampanjer mot multinationella företag för att få dem att höja lönerna i fabriker i tredje världen. Vad har sådana kampanjer för effekter? I ”Multinationals and Sweatshop Activism”, publicerad i American Economic Review, undersöks denna fråga:

[W]e exploit geographic variation in the anti-sweatshop movement within the TFA [textile, footwear, and apparel] sector in Indonesia. The anti-sweatshop campaign targeted contractors for Nike, Reebok, and Adidas. Consequently, we compare the real wage growth of TFA plants in districts with contractors working for these firms relative to TFA plants in other districts. … Comparing wage growth in districts targeted by activists relative to other districts, the effects are even larger. Real wages increased as much as 30 percent in large foreignowned and exporting TFA plants relative to other TFA plants.

Kampanjerna verkar alltså ha haft en stor, positiv effekt på lönerna — utan att sänka sysselsättningen:

One question that naturally arises is how such large real wage increases could be sustained without adverse consequences for employment. We examine whether these higher wages led firms to cut employment or shut down operations. Our results suggest that the minimum wage increases led to employment losses for production workers across all sectors in manufacturing. While anti-sweatshop activism did not have additional adverse effects on employment within the TFA sector, it did lead to falling profits, reduced productivity growth, and plant closures for smaller exporters.

Det finns en avvägning här: risken är att företag slås ut i konkurrensen med andra och lägger ner när lönerna ökar kraftigt. Sådana tendenser har börjat skönjas i Indonesien: mycket produktion flyttar t.ex. till Vietnam. Det kan också vara så att löneökningarna är tillfälliga. Men kampanjerna gav, som det verkar, resultat, vilket förvånade mig.