I uppsatsen ”Ultimate Moral Responsibility Is Impossible: New Insights into the Basic Argument” utvecklar Brian Parks ett argument för varför ingen kan vara genuint moraliskt ansvarig för något, inte ens för de hemskaste handlingar. Hitler var inte moraliskt ansvarig för sina illdåd; inte Stalin heller. (Han bygger vidare på Galen Strawsons arbete på detta område.)

Så här ser argumentet ut:

(i) If individuals can be ultimately responsible for their choices, then, given the facts of human history, there is at least one individual X who is ultimately responsible for some choice C and who, in virtue of having freely chosen C, genuinely deserves some punishment P.
(ii) There is at least one individual Z who does not deserve P.
(iii) If there is at least one individual Z who does not deserve P, then X can only genuinely deserve P if:
a. Z would not have freely chosen C if he had been in the exact same internal and external circumstances as X, and
b. The fact that Z would not have freely chosen C is not entirely a consequence of random, unguided chance.
(iv) The requirements of (iii) cannot be satisfied.
(v) Individuals cannot be ultimately responsible for their choices.

Inte övertygad? Läs gärna uppsatsen och ta del av den mer utvecklade argumentationen.