Ger oberoende centralbank prisstabilitet?

Martin Flodén presenterar den numera etablerade bilden av att oberoende centralbanker har medfört låg inflation. En ny studie av Sven-Olov Daunfeldt och Xavier de Luna, ”Central Bank Independence and Price Stability: Evidence from OECD-Countries”, publicerad i Oxford Economic Papers, indikerar att denna slutsats kanske kan ifrågasättas:

In this paper, we use a non-parametric regression method to compare the transition process from high to low inflation with the implementation dates of central bank independence reforms. In most countries, price stability is achieved before more independence is given to the central bank. Moreover, for those countries which have implemented a central bank independence reform under a high inflation regime, no evidence is found that the reforms have actually led to price stability. This suggests that the credibility of a low inflation goal can be achieved without institutional reforms which grant the central bank more independence from the political policymakers.

Om centralbankers oberoende inte har varit en central faktor bakom den lägre inflationen, blir den intressanta forskningsfrågan vilka andra faktorer som har varit avgörande.